#169 – Katherine Eban: COVID-19 Lab Leak: Examining all sides of the debate and discussing barriers to a full investigation

Katherine Eban is an award-winning investigative journalist who previously appeared on The Drive to discuss the widespread fraud in the generic drug industry. In this episode, she discusses the content of her recent Vanity Fair article, which examined the evidence for the theory that the COVID-19 pandemic resulted from a virus lab escape as opposed to a natural virus that came from an animal host. Katherine and Peter walk through the evidence for both theories as well as discuss the long and troubling history of dangerous lab leaks and safety concerns about the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  They also talk about the controversy surrounding gain-of-function research and its funding by the US government. Finally, they conclude with a discussion on the likelihood of definitively establishing the origins of the virus given the Chinese government’s lack of cooperation and highlight the fact that the many barriers to performing a full investigation may be the most troubling aspect of the controversy. This episode was originally recorded on July 6, 2021. 

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We discuss:

• An overview of the lab leak controversy [1:30];
• The troubling history of lab leaks of dangerous pathogens [8:30];
• The zoonotic transmission theory: did SARS2 come from a bat? [11:45];
• The debate about gain-of-function (GoF) research [26:15];
• Questions about US funding of GoF research in China [33:45];
• The uncertain significance of the furin cleavage site [51:30];
• Discerning what’s most important about both the zoonotic transmission and lab leak theories [1:01:15];
• Barriers to a full investigation [1:19:15]; and
• More.

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Note: This podcast was recorded on July 6th, 2021. Because we want our subscribers to have access to comprehensive information about this controversial topic in a very quick time frame, these show notes differ in format from our usual approach. They are only loosely chronological and provide additional information not covered in the podcast.  Following the show notes there is an extensive list of links for those who desire to do more in-depth reading on this topic.

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An overview of the lab leak controversy [1:30]

• There is a brewing controversy around the origins of the virus responsible for COVID-19
  • There is no information in the public domain either regarding the viral sequence or other circumstantial evidence that would help answer the question about the origins of the virus
  • At the time of the pandemic’s arrival, it was believed that this was a virus of zoonotic origin
    • Thought to be a virus that occurred naturally 
    • Likely originated from bats and transferred to an intermediary animal and then eventually humans in the wet markets of Wuhan, China
  • In early 2020, some critics began to question the zoonotic origin theory
    • they were met with the sharpest rebukes from both the scientific and political communities
    • The Lancet and Nature Medicine both published statements critical of the lab leak theory
    • Said such statements were xenophobic or otherwise ill-informed and conspiratorial
• Since that time, however, there has been a push for greater transparency
  • Starting in March 2021, an international coalition of more than 20 scientists (organized by Jamie Metzl) published four open letters calling for an investigation into the lab leak theory
  • The call to investigate the lab leak theory is driven by two factors:
    • Unlike the cases of SARS-1 and MERS, which are very similar viruses, there has yet to be any identified species of origin and/or intermediary despite much effort
    • There has been an abject lack of transparency to date
      • In an autocratic nation like China, transparency is not a cultural norm, whether this was a lab leak or not
      • An inability to find the cause or discovery of a mistake would not have been acknowledged to the international scientific community
      • Why did we not take the lab leak theory seriously a year or 18 months ago when it might have been easier to gather information?
      • Robert Redfield, the former head of the CDC, offered to send in a team of experts to do widespread testing in Wuhan, especially the WIV
        • He thinks a lab leak could have been ruled out in a couple weeks if this had been done, but the Chinese government refused and destroyed records instead
        • It also blocked access to the mine where workers had been sickened months before the pandemic by a virus similar to SARS2

• The lab leak theory is not a unitary theory
  • Could be that researchers collected samples of natural viruses, a lab worker contracted one in the lab via aerosol transmission, and then the infected worker exposed others in the community
  • Could also be that researchers had been manipulating viruses to see if they would become more infectious, known as “gain-of-function” (GoF) research, and then that genetically modified virus was accidentally leaked into the community through an exposed worker

• Attention has focused on the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)
  • Located near the Wuhan market where the first cases were identified
  • housed bat viral samples
  • had been doing the type of research that could create a virus like SARS2
  • The lead coronavirus researcher at WIV, Shi Zhengli, is known as “Bat woman” 
    • She has had a very successful career
    • is well-known for figuring out that the mechanism of transition for SARS1 was through the ACE-2 receptors in human lung cells
  • The Chinese CDC is also located in Wuhan right next to the market
    • Also had a collection of bat viruses
    • Fewer clues have pointed in its direction, and we know less about its work because it was not US-funded, but it cannot be definitively ruled out as a potential source of a lab leak
• The Chinese government has impeded a full investigation of the pandemic from the beginning
  • Shut down the wet market, ordered laboratory samples destroyed, claimed the right to review any scientific research about COVID-19 ahead of publication, expelled journalists, blocked search terms, pulled papers offline, penalized citizens who spoke out or questioned what happened, limited access of WHO team
  • There is no information about 3 WIV lab workers who became ill in summer/fall 2019 in the public domain
  • By now it may not be possible to find out the true origin of the virus

The troubling history of lab leaks of dangerous pathogens [8:30]

“This is not like, ‘Oh, how could that ever happen?’ In a way it’s like, ‘How could it not happen?’ Because it’s happened over and over and over again.” —Katherine Eban

• There are numerous examples of other infectious agents, especially SARS, escaping from labs before this pandemic
• In May 2021, former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb said that laboratory leaks “happen all the time”

SARS1

Since July 2003, there have been 4 incidents of SARS1 escaping from 3 different labs 

Of these, 3 were caused by breaches in laboratory biosafety and each resulted in at least one case of SARS:

• In September 2003, a cross contamination in a Singapore lab caused one case of SARS
  • A PhD student became infected with SARS after his samples of West Nile virus were cross-contaminated with live SARS virus in a BSL-3 lab
  • The student used to working in BSL-2 labs was given only 20 minutes of training before being allowed to work in a BSL-3 lab
    • He was working at an institute because a BSL-3 lab was unavailable at his university
    • 3 days after his first day in the lab, he became ill with SARS
    • An investigation found multiple problems with both record keeping and lab practices and showed that there had been SARS contamination within the BSL-3
  • Though it was a serious safety breach, the government did a thorough and transparent investigation and “used it as an opportunity to fundamentally redesign its biosafety approach”

• In December 2003, an accidental spill at a lab in Taipei, Taiwan caused one case of SARS
  • This second incident occurred at a military BSL-4 lab
  • Authorities were not notified in a timely manner
  • large epidemic potential because it involved international air travel shortly after infection
  • The infected researcher was a 44-year-old US-educated pathologist who found a rip in a bag in the negative-pressure transport cabinet of the laboratory 
    • He was in a rush and did not want to clean the spill using the necessary method of vaporized hydrogen peroxide, which would have taken hours, so instead he used a 70% ethanol spray
    • Wearing a regular mask and surgical gloves and no surgical gown, he stuck his head inside the cabinet to spray the spill
    • Ten minutes later, he wiped the spill and put the bag with the leak on the trash cart
    • He had lost his building access card and had used a borrowed one to get into the building
  • He flew to Singapore the next day with 6 colleagues but did not have a fever or seek medical care until he returned to Taiwan 3 days later
  • Aware that might have SARS but not wanting to disgrace the lab or Taiwan, he quarantined at home with his father and would not to go the hospital until his father threatened to commit suidcide
  • The lab did not have an incident-reporting procedure in place
  • There was no follow-up medical monitoring even though he missed 6 days of work
  • His family and colleagues were quarantined, as were fellow airline passengers from several countries after they were located
  • The Taiwanese government temporarily closed the lab and sanctioned the researcher, who was barred from seeking research project funding
  • There was an international investigation and all understood that it could have been a disaster; it was lucky that only the pathologist was infected

• In February 2004, the third incident (technically two events) occurred in a BSL-3 lab at the Institute of Virology in Beijing and caused two cases of SARS 
  • It’s “a story of towering academic ego, shocking incompetence, obstruction of the truth and lack of accountability”
  • A senior researcher had “lost face” with his initial incorrect theory
    • Based on electron microscope results, virus expert Hong Tao identified chlamydia as the main pathogen in the atypical pneumonia that had started to be seen in Guangdong province
    • The pathogen turned out to be SARS, but because of Hong Tao’s senior status his theory was accepted, and China fell behind in research as exploring other hypotheses was banned or discouraged
  • Hong wanted to restore his reputation by making the CDC a leader in SARS research 
    • As the CDC’s research expanded, some SARS strains and potentially infectious materials began to be kept in two other BSL-3 labs, which were doing research on the diarrhea and prion viruses
    • The SARS BSL-3 laboratory was right next door to a BSL-2 electron microscope room
    • The lab was so overcrowded that SARS was kept in a locked fridge in the hall
    • Researchers carried the virus into the BSL-2 room to use the electron microscope, but the virus inactivation technology used by the lab was inadequate
  • Two researchers contracted SARS and became ill
    • Details were not shared by the government and are largely unknown
    • Both seem to have recovered without infecting anyone else
  • The Chinese government began to inspect labs around the country

In April 2004, the 4th incident (also technically two events, and also at the Institute of Virology in Beijing) resulted in 9 cases of SARS (7 from one chain of transmission / hospital spread), including one death

 

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